Context:

In this report we present our concluding thoughts after having read the chapters 1, 2, 5, 6 & 8 of Karen Barad’s “Meeting the Universe Halfway”. In these chapters, she explains her notion of ethico-onto-epistemology pulling together insights gained from quantum physics and the fact that our practices literally ‘matter’ (hence: New Materialism). The way we got here was in first reading Bergson’s “Time and Free Will” (see report here) to then see how Bergson’s initial challenge to psychophysics morphed into the Einstein-Bergson debate on the primacy of physics over philosophy (see report here). We then read A.N. Whitehead’s “Process and Reality” to see another principled objection to a classical-corpuscular view of mechanistic physics as the ideal scientific and philosophical view (see report here). His more holistic interpretation of the universe based on physico-mathematical interpretations (known as ‘process philosophy’) is largely ignored in contemporary analytic philosophy but serves as direct inspiration to many contemporary thinkers across scientific disciplines. Although Barad does not explicitly make reference to him, it proved worthwhile to contrast Whitehead’s thinking with that of N. Bohr (see report here). Bohr’s philosophy-physics is – for Barad – the foundation of her ethico-onto-epistemological analysis in chapters 3, 4 & 7. She argues that the epistemological lesson of Bohr needs to be extended to its ontological implications (see report here). What remains then is the link to the ethical analysis that is a fil rouge – a background motif, if you will – with all of the thinkers mentioned before. It’s also a link between quantitative insights (as in quantum physics) and qualitative insights gained from studying the lived experience (as in gender, disability and culture studies).

Barad – the conclusive:

For us there is no question Barad in fact succeeds in entangling the insights from quantum physics with those based on discursivity as discussed by Foucault and Butler’s analysis of performativity. This means that the simplistic ideas of, on the one hand, a deterministic and exact scientific view of the universe and, on the other hand, the idea of social construction ‘through-and-through’ are to be abandoned definitively. Instead, we need to accept that the actual (agential) realist view is one wherein our practices make a literal material difference. As agents or actors in this world we do not remain unmoved but, in moving, we also do not leave the world unmoved. In science we are therefore not looking for some isolated matter or some isolated practice that, on analysis, can give a definite explanation of phenomena. No, in science we’re concerned with a, necessarily indeterminate, dynamic of phenomena that produce a world in which we (humans and nonhumans) live together. While we cannot fully determine this intra-action, we are accountable for what happens since we do have a choice to exclude or include others by the practices we adopt.

Here we have added – to the epistemological and ontological dimensions discussed in our previous session – the beginning of an ethical dimension by linking the themes of quantum physical indeterminacy with the themes of (acceptance of) diversity in gender, disability as well as cultural studies. This is done by replacing the dominant exact scientific metaphor of reflection and representation by the new metaphor of diffraction and production. The latter indeed emerged from the discussion of quantum physics as an unavoidable element (this mirrors themes independently taken up by Bergson and Whitehead) in contrast to notions of exact science that, sticking with a Newtonian deterministic worldview, want to eliminate this element as a mere ‘disturbance’. 

As said above, whilst we differ on whether all aspects of Barad’s analysis succeed, we do agree that the above conclusion is unavoidable: given there is unavoidably an element of entanglement or diffraction in science (as in any practice), science comes with impacts on our world that cannot be disentangled from what happens in that world. In Barad’s words – science ‘matters’ and therefore it matters what we do in science (and how we do it)..

Barad – the inconclusive:

For us there is also no question that there is more work to do on how this specifically does matter from an ethical point of view. The examples in ‘Meeting The Universe Halfway’ are, in our view, not concrete enough to provide actual guidance for instance in the field of our project: neurodevelopmental disorders. 

Maybe the reason why it stays a little too abstract in connecting with ethical concerns is a consequence of laying too much focus on diffraction and disregarding the complementary aspect of reflection. Maybe (see also the discussion on humanism vs posthumanism in the previous report) this leads to a loss of connection to the typically ethical questions of doing justice to a specific other. These are interesting angles also suggested by previous reading but probably it matters less to study these angles in a very abstract way given what we’re missing is a connection to the very concrete of ethical practices in the here and now or the you and me. At least in our discussion, we spontaneously geared towards the question of how science matters and, in light of the above, what a good scientific practice is. 

A call for intra-action:

So, we end this reading club with a desire to produce something that builds on the reading we have done: a way to argue that – contrary to the received opinion in the modern West – science without experience is simply unscientific. This probably requires us to make more precise how quantitative and qualitative methods combine to form good science (maybe in the way that Oliver Sacks’ efforts to give people with a neurodevelopmental disorder their own voice was critical in unleashing scientific advance in this field). We believe this would be a worthwhile bridge between New Materialism and more conventional views of science and ethics, an intra-action bringing scientists and scholars in the different disciplines closer instead of digging ever deeper terminological trenches.

Context:

We finally arrived at the destination of our Book club’s journey: Karen Barad’s “Meeting the Universe Halfway”. The way we got here was reading Bergson’s “Time and Free Will” (see report here) to then see how Bergson’s initial challenge to psychophysics morphed into the Einstein-Bergson debate about the primacy of physics over philosophy (see report here). We then stopped over at A.N. Whitehead’s “Process and Reality” to see another principled objection to a classical-corpuscular view of mechanistic physics as the ideal scientific and philosophical view (see report here). His more holistic interpretation of the universe based on physico-mathematical interpretations (known as ‘process philosophy’) is largely ignored in contemporary analytic philosophy but serves as direct inspiration to many contemporary thinkers across scientific disciplines. Although Barad does not explicitly make reference to him, it proved worthwhile to contrast Whitehead’s thinking with that of N. Bohr (see report here). Indeed, the philosophical ideas of Bohr are the starting point of Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway and Whitehead as well as Bohr developed their ideas in explicit contrast with those of Einstein. Small wonder then that the same respectful criticism of Einstein is a fil rouge in Barad who, herself a quantum physicist, takes up the philosophical implications of  physics which have proven so counterintuitive for deterministic thinking. As it is a quite massive book giving rise to a lot of intra-acting (see how dogeared it is) we split the debate in two. In this penultimate session we talk about her interpretation of quantum physics (the chapters 3, 4, 7). In the next (final) one we conclude by looking at the ethical ramifications she distills out of this interpretation (ethics is a common theme across all these thinkers!).

Barad on Bohr – the agreement:

Bohr’s ‘philosophy-physics’ is the starting point for Barad. She first disentangles it in a very meticulous way from the ‘uncertainty’ reading which is probably most well known from the like-named principle proposed by Heisenberg. Instead, according to us quite rightly so, it is argued that Bohr preferred the term ‘indeterminacy’ as this captured the lesson of quantum physics more accurately. Indeed, it is not that there is something determined in spacetime that we cannot measure without disturbing it, i.e. without uncertainty. Rather, Bohr’s idea of complementarity holds that there’s no such determined thing prior to (or separate from) our observation of it. Instead, the fact revealed by quantum physics is that, when we observe a quantum phenomenon, we need to make a choice on how we want to observe it. It is this choice that allows us to determine the phenomenon either as to its object characteristic (its position) or as to its wave characteristics (its momentum). These two complementary ways of observing it require two different, and mutually exclusive, experimental arrangements. In this way the very idea of physics as deterministics, so preferred by Einstein, is no longer a tenable position (as Barad, specifically in chapter 7 explains with reference to experiments that could not be carried out in Bohr’s time but have been carried out in the meantime).

As the below picture tries to illustrate, this puts Barad and Bohr very far removed from the contemporary Western consensus assuming that a scientific explanation needs ultimately to be grounded by concept of an isolated particular or individual. In this her analysis is to a large extent on the same wavelength as that of Whitehead who, as we saw before, started from the non-separability of phenomena based on the image of wave propagation. This is far removed from the current Western consensus, with its view of the particular importance of the thought of a conscious individual human being. This is illustrated by both Whitehead and Bohr emphasizing affinity of their philosophy and science with Eastern thought.

That said, Barad also explicitly says she wants to go further than Bohr. Maybe fittingly, this is also where our discussion group started disagreeing. This, hopefully productive, debate is summarized in the next section but before we switch to that I complete the discussion of the above picture by stating that Barad’s view emphasizes (see Whitehead’s starting point) the entangled nature of nature. As she herself says, the title Meeting the Universe Halfway is not about taking a kind of middle position in the way Bohr can be interpreted. No, she is clearly taking diffraction as the ultimate truth revealed by quantum physics.

Barad on Bohr – the disagreement:

We can be brief about the disagreement of Barad and Bohr (hence about us disagreeing in our discussion). The basic issue Barad has with Bohr is that he limited his official lesson to a lesson of epistemology (how we can know nature) where she argues his argument leads to a straightforward ontological conclusion (how nature is). For Barad, philosophy-physics as proposed by Bohr should not be limited to the way we, humans, obtain knowledge but it should be seen as the generic way in which phenomena come to matter. This allows her to introduce her key concept of intra-agency within phenomena connecting epistemology not only to ontology but also to ethics. The limit of human knowledge which Bohr self-imposed on himself is then a remnant of a humanism that still makes humans to be too exceptional a species in our world.

We disagreed on whether this extension of Bohr’s epistemological lesson is correct and – relatedly –  whether his self-avowed humanism indeed restricts his ethical outlook to one in which the human species is the be all and end all of nature. Luckily, we have one session left to see whether we can find agreement based on our previous readings where, as said above already, ethical questions always lurked in the background. Whatever else we might find of Barad, she clearly has the merit of putting these questions front and center in a bold way within a principled discussion of contemporary advances in scientific knowledge! 

To be continued – humanism vs. posthumanism:

Next time, and this will be the coronation of this specific book club, we therefore start with specifical ethical questions that motivated the NeuroEpigenEthics project. This will bring us to the issues why ‘New Materialist’ views are critically important in no longer separating of issues of a scientific/materialistic and an ethics/diversity nature. We will read the remaining chapters of Meeting The Universe Halfway that make a connection between interpretation of (quantum) physics and ethical theorizing (a connection that all of the thinkers discussed in this book club endorse in one way or the other). We will then see whether the humanism of Bohr is indeed incompatible with the insights of contemporary continental thought such as for instance developed in posthumanism. Or whether we can find some “golden middle” ground where we can all meet after all.

Context:

We started our journey towards Karen Barad’s “Meeting the Universe Halfway” by reading Bergson’s “Time and Free Will” (see report here). We then saw Bergson’s initial challenge to psychophysics morphing into the Einstein-Bergson debate about the primacy of physics over philosophy (see report here). We saw that Bergson was not the only one contesting a classical-corpuscular view of mechanistic physics as the ideal for science (and, therefore, philosophy). We discussed A. N. Whitehead’s proposal (see report here) of a more holistic interpretation of the universe based on physico-mathematical interpretations. Although this ‘process philosophy’ was largely ignored in contemporary analytic philosophy, it serves as direct inspiration to a lot of contemporary thinkers outside of that tradition. Our last stop will be dedicated to the philosophical ideas of Niels Bohr explicitly discussed in Karen Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway. Bohr also contrasted his ideas explicitly with those of Einstein which made it interesting to look at (the many) alignments and (some) discrepancies of his views, as founding father of quantum physics with the philosophy proposed by Whitehead.

Read moreFrom Bergson over Bohr to Barad Session 4: Bohr and/vs. Whitehead

Context:

We started our journey towards Karen Barad’s “Meeting the Universe Halfway” by reading Bergson’s “Time and Free Will” (see report here). We then saw Bergson’s initial challenge to psychophysics morphing into the Einstein-Bergson debate about the primacy of physics over philosophy (see report here). From a contemporary, modern Western, point of view it was Einstein’s point of view that prevailed, so entrenching the classical-corpuscular view of mechanistic physics as the ideal science (and therefore philosophy) should strive for. Such a view was however not only contested by Bergson but in his own way by A. N. Whitehead who thereby inspired contemporary thinkers such as Donna Haraway. We were fortunate enough to get introduced to Whitehead by Ronny Desmet (author of the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on him). Although Whitehead is almost erased from the history of analytic philosophy, his approach was of a thoroughly mathematical and physicist nature and at the same time embraced elements of Eastern philosophy. As shown in the picture of a letter by Whitehead, he directly interacted with Einstein and, whilst in Harvard, was mentor of many leading analytic philosophers like Quine. Therefore he may well be pivotal in controversies between the current philosophical traditions. In the following we provide a short reflection on this session. After this we’ll have one session on the interpretation of quantum physics by Whitehead and Bohr. This makes us well prepared for our final goal of an informed discussion of Karen Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway.

Read moreFrom Bergson over Bohr to Barad Session 3: Whitehead’s relational alternative

Context:

We started our journey towards Karen Barad’s “Meeting the Universe Halfway” in reading Bergson’s “Time and Free Will” (see report here). Where Bergson initially demarcated his idea of the lived experience of ‘durée’ against psychophysics, history moved it quickly to a debate between physics and philosophy. We read a report on this historical debate arguing that there was more nuance to it than the often reported ‘victory’ of Einstein over Bergson (Canales 2005). Jan Potters delved somewhat deeper in the history of this debate (see the board scheme). This brought us seamlessly to the discussion of the primacy of intuition vs. that of measurement, a theme prominent in the philosophy of Alfred N. Whitehead. Ronny Desmet introduced us to his independent reflections on this debate. This also led us to an initial comparison with Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics and a reflection on the philosophical influences of Bohr (which took us back to contemporaneous discussions in a still emerging field of psychology). We will unpack this briefly below and look forward to the next session that is dedicated to Whitehead after which we head back to Bohr and Barad.

The Bergson-Einstein debate:

The below scheme by Jan Potters traces the genesis of this debate. Initially, left column of the scheme, Einstein sought to make sense of time and simultaneity for distant events that could not be experienced directly together. His solution, relativity of time and simultaneity, was taken by French physicists as a challenge to Bergson’s notion of the factual anchor of ‘durée’ (see middle column). At this point Bergson engaged the central ‘twin paradox’ case in this challenge to reaffirm in the face of the advance in physics his position that authority with respect to reality remained with lived experience instead of yielding to a mathematical relativization of experience (see rightmost column). We highlight the main positions based on the discussion of the ‘twin paradox’ mentioned higher.

After Einstein’s basic derivation of relativity in 1905, it was Langevin in 1911 who applied it to relativity of experience. Where Einstein’s derivation relied on the synchronicity of clocks, as paradigm example of periodic processes allowing to compare time between two inertial frames moving with respect to each other at near-lightspeed, Langevin concretized it into a thought experiment involving biological beings. After all, he argued, biological – and hence also psychological – processes were also periodic. In that case we can imagine a twin, let’s call them Pierre and Paul, where the first stays on earth and the second is launched at 0,8 light speed with a rocket. If Paul would return after 10 years (on Pierre’s clock) then Paul’s clock would have only advanced 6 years. Einstein concurred in 1912 explicitly stating that physics clearly proves that any psychological conceptions of time are off the mark at high velocities. Following that Becquerel (1922) argued that physics shows Pierre and Paul can equally claim their time is real and therefore that all experience of time is relative.

It is at this point Bergson engaged the discussion with Einstein, see (Canales 2005), as his central contention of “Time and Free Will” was challenged. Bergson also had used a Pierre and Paul thought experiment precisely to show that no mathematical-physical description of reality could challenge the basic intuition of time and simultaneity as anchored in a lived experience of durée. Here he invited the reader to imagine Pierre gathering all knowledge on Paul in order to predict Paul’s move. Bergson argued that it is clear that for Pierre to be able to do that precisely he had to become identical to Paul, in which case we could not be calling what Pierre did predicting but merely living the move Paul makes. Bergson used in the twin paradox a similar argument based on the principle of reciprocity: in order for Paul and Pierre to compare times they had to come together in the same frame of reference i.e. either one of them had to speed up or the other had to slow down. Anyway, one had finally to choose one frame as the final frame of reference from which the situation was observed by someone. 

The debate then was not so much about the physics as such (Bergson never disputed the insights of Einstein as such) but about a question of final authority. Was it that, as Bergson argued, of the lived experience meaning philosophy had authority separate from physics? Or was it a question of quantitative measurement in a physico-mathematical framework, as Einstein had it, meaning physics had the ultimate authority in these questions? Or is it the same to measure the half-life of muons in two reference frames or have an actual twin that comes back together after space travel?

Enter Whitehead and Bohr:

As mentioned above Whitehead had already independently thought about the last matter. He tried to find a common ground between scientific measurement and intuitions based on experience. Part of his solution was to recognize that, even if intuition was fallible, there is in any measurement also an intuitive part: if we judge that two things are ‘as long’ then this requires us to share some experience of ‘as long’. He therefore would not agree that time is merely ‘psychologically’ relative but try to argue for a conception of time that combined a psychological and physico-mathematical aspect (a combination, see our previous section, that Bergson seems to resist). A concrete point of engagement for Whitehead is his ‘fallacy of simple location’ or of ‘misplaced concreteness’ that creates fictions of ‘isolated particles’, instead of taking relationality as basic notion.
We will delve into this in detail in our next session. Meanwhile, it is important to note that in the background of all this there were discussion in both physics and psychology critical of atomistic views. In physics Maxwell created field theories which accounted for phenomena outside the reach of mechanistic physics. In psychology, James (inspired by and inspiring Bergson) criticized associationism linking external givens to psychological states. Both will have inspired Bohr who a.o. attended lessons of Höffding taking a close look at James. So here physics and psychology come together again to inspire Bohr to take a view that kept complementarity between mechanistic and vitalist views in his, contextualist, interpretation of quantum mechanics. But now we get ahead of ourselves and will first turn to Whitehead who, in siding with relationality as basic, clearly demarcates himself from Einsteinian views regarding substances as basic.

Jo Bervoets

References:

Canales, Jimena. 2005. “Einstein, Bergson, and the Experiment That Failed: Intellectual Cooperation at the League of Nations.” MLN. https://doi.org/10.1353/mln.2006.0005.

In “Meeting the Universe Halfway” Karen Barad connects quantum mechanics to the ideas in continental and feminist traditions. She so creates a reference work in new materialism, specifically referencing Bohr’s views on the interpretation of quantum mechanics. What we (with philosophical, ethical, cognitive science and history of physics backgrounds) wonder is whether this affords to bridge the gap that people with an ‘exact-scientific’ worldview, or with an ‘analytic mindset’, often experience with respect to work in continental philosophy. A gap that has less to do with the conclusions on diversity and the importance of reports of lived experience as with the way it is phrased in this tradition. The way we approach this is to try to read chronologically on the debates between quantitative science and experience, or qualitative, data. As a starting point, Rob Sips proposed reading of Bergson’s “Time and Free Will” essay. As an endpoint we fix on reading of Karen Barad’s “Meeting the Universe Halfway”. In between we will see plot a course over the Einstein-Bergson debate and over the various interpretations of quantum mechanics of Bohr and Whitehead. 

Below is the read-out of the first session discussing Bergson’s “Time and Free Will”.

Read moreFrom Bergson over Bohr to Barad 1: Bergson’s Time and Free Will